The K3 test in 1962 Kazakhstan by the Soviet Union graphically proved that. Keep in mind that this particular test was only 300 kilotons.
Of note was an under ground power line running from Astana (then called Aqmola) the capital city of Kazakhstan, to the city of Almaty just under 600 miles away. Another was an underground telephone line that was 560 miles. Both were fried along with a multitude of various instruments and equipment along the way. It was enough to catch the power plant on fire that the line was feeding from, and enough to cook all phone equipment.
The Soviets had the entire area plastered with various instruments, especially along those lines. It was determined through those instruments that the E3 component took 20 seconds to peak out, and over a minute to decay. The telluric flux created by the device peaked at 1,300nT/minute. For comparison, the solar storm that took out the entire Quebec grid on March 13, 1989 only made it to 480nT/minute.
Modern devices would be detonated at approximately the same altitude, but with 1.2-5 megatons. Just one of those would shut down the entire eastern seaboard of the U.S.
That is the problem with grounding against EMP. An Earth ground won't work due to the nature of the E3 component. (rise times in terms of seconds and minutes, excessive nT rates, etc)
Then there is dialectic breakdown of windings and insulators. During that test, the Soviets realized there was a potential for loss of power. Their fix was to move a multitude of diesel generators into the area. Most of the failed due to dialectic breakdown of their windings.
That by itself would take a month of Sundays to explain so I'll reference you to the wiki page on that. It's a bit simplistic, but gives you the idea.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electrical_breakdown
That breaks into another aspect of the problem. It's not over for a very long time. Days, months, and potentially years. The Quebec grid experienced this problem for a few months after the event was over and it did not have to deal with the E1 and E2 problems.
Alternators, generators, if it's got a coil, its subject to failure due to that problem.
Therein addresses one the most egregious erroneous assumptions regarding the subject matter. Old cars, diesels, etc are safe. They are not. Starters, alternators, generators, all are subject to dialectic breakdown.
Vehicles in general are examples of floating grounds. You don't see cars and trucks dragging a long piece of wire grounding off behind them. They will be relatively safe from the worst of the E3 component, but they are still subject to the E1 and E2 components (top down).
This is mitigated by the lack of complexity involved in their operation, but it's a good idea to have a spare alternator, generator, starter, and coil, especially the coil for gas run vehicles.
Consideration should be given to all electric devices and motors. For instance the electric compressor motor for you central heat and air, the motor for your refrigerator/freezer etc. this is very often overlooked.
That dialectic break down factor is one of the reasons why the "EMP commission report" was such bovine excrement. Not only did they cherry pick the vehicles being tested, severely restricted the number of those that were tested, extrapolated results using algorithms that were complete hogwash, they also gave absolutely no consideration for dialectic break down at all.
Now lets talk a bit about the phone line that was in the K3 test.
There were reports of 1500 to 3400 amperes induced currents in the line. That information comes from the paper "IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Vol. 40, No. 4, November 1998".
More specifically from it's co-author Vladimir Loborev which I've had the fortune to personally meet and question on the subject while on a project in Ukraine.
Those official reports underplay what actually happened on the ground according to him. It busted every fuse, and relay in the system, caused multiple fires, and that's just the short list.
Next time your out, look around at the cable company, telephone company, etc lines. Now picture them all with spikes of three thousand amps.
That brings us to another egregious assumption. Fire.
What do you think is going to happen when that cable line running into your house is suddenly hit with three thousand amps? For that matter, not even the power line feeding your house is built to withstand that. That's enough amperage to jump over any standard protection. Those little surge protectors are going to go up in smoke.
Our answer to this was to build a smaller external breaker room for all homes of our members. All external connections go through this room first, which is equipped with multiple breakers/surge protectors. We fully expect them to be cooked off should an EMP event occur. In effect, they are sacrificial. Each has a mechanically/thermally activated halon suppression system. That was our answer to the problem, you may have a differing solution.
Here is some light reading. This was the report produced for ORNL related to solar geomagnetic storms. Go to page 45 of the pdf where it analyzes the Quebec storm in 89.
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/ees/etsd/pes/pubs/ferc_Meta-R-319.pdf
It's an interesting read for you electrical guru's out there.
Of significance, the ground induced currents (GIC) used as a peak for a standard in that report, do not even match the K3 test measured peaks, nor even come close to the projected numbers for a modern EMP device.
Boiling down the BS, they are saying a G5 or better solar storm could knock out the grid as a whole with lingering effects for years after. Those large transformers in particular are not some that can be crapped out over night, in fact, their lead time is in terms of years.
With that in mind, what more do you think an EMP device would do when the modern versions are said to be several orders of magnitude stronger than than that of the K3 device?
The effects of the starfish prime experiments were misleading as the distance to populated areas was close to one thousand miles. The real world effects of the K3 Soviet experiments were not, as they were performed over populated areas.
Power plants caught fire, multiple phone and power related buildings caught fire, several homes caught fire, and even some of the backup diesel generators caught fire. It is not a question of ‘if’ it will happen. The simulations are just about all BS, real world results say that and far more ‘will’ happen. Many have based planning on the misinformation. That can get them killed.
Let’s briefly address the EMP commission. The gentlemen had this to say:
Quote:
Dr. Forstchen's book is quite technically accurate, although it greatly oversimplifies many EMP effects, especially the EMP effect on automobiles. In his defense, though, Dr. Forstchen didn't have access to the latest EMP-automobile simulator test information when he wrote the book. (The contract for the book was actually completed in early 2006). Most of the earlier EMP-automobile data was much more dismal, and there are still a great many uncertainties about the EMP effect on automobiles because of the very small number of vehicles that have actually been tested. The 1962 Soviet experience with the repeated burnout of military diesel generators using no solid state electronics is a warning not to rely too heavily on simulator testing. It is important to remember that the last time an automobile was actually tested against a real nuclear EMP was in 1962. Actual electromagnetic damage in the real world is far messier than any simulations would indicate.
The EMP Commission's testing of automobiles was only done up to a level of 50,000 volts per meter, and in most cases, the EMP levels were not even taken up nearly that high. The EMP Commission did not take the level up to see at what level the automobiles would fail to run. From everything that is published in open (non-classified) English-language scientific papers, 50,000 volts per meter is about the maximum electric field strength that can be produced by first and second generation nuclear weapons of any size. However, EMP Commission staff members have stated in sworn testimony before the U.S. Congress that "super-EMP" weapons have been developed (by more than one country) that are capable of generating up to 200,000 volts per meter below the detonation, and 100,000 volts per meter at the horizon. (It is impossible to confirm the accuracy of these claims.)
Let me correct him. The K3 experiment gave real world results. 100,000 volts per meter at the horizon can and have been obtained. He caveats the statement because not many are willing to go on record as having made the statement as it delves into the grey areas of classified information. He’s interviewed some of the same folks I have, of that I am confident as his numbers match the same numbers I was told. That btw, is why in another thread, I consider 100,000 to be necessary, and why the box design is to 100K. If you so happen to be caught out directly underneath it, there is not much you’re going to be able to do about it.
Here is another quote where he sneaks in the truth.
http://www.futurescience.com/emp/has280010_0.html#59
[H.A.S.C. No. 106–31]
ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE THREATS TO U.S. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE
HEARING
BEFORE THE
MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
HEARING HELD
OCTOBER 7, 1999
To understand the significance of Dr. Woods testimony to Congress in 1999, you must also understand he was the power behind the emp commission report. Compare that to the EMP commission report. It makes it crystal clear that the EMP commission report was nothing but fluff to rub the bellies of the politicians looking to sooth the nerves of their constituents. Herein is what he ‘really’ Thinks:
http://www.marshall.org/experts.php?id=113
Quote:
Mr. BARTLETT. Dr. Wood.
Dr. WOOD (Wood, Dr. Lowell. The ability, sir, to simulate EMP for reasonably compact systems that definitely have existed in the past to a regrettably good approximation doesn't exist at the present time. Perhaps the single largest such facility was the trestle facility to which Dr. Bernardin referred to at Kirkland Air Force Base. That could actually take and was built to take an entire B–52 bomber and could subject it to quite realistic of an EMP environment, and was built specifically for that purpose. The comparable facilities existed and were created typically on special-purpose bases at the Nevada test site in underground facilities for testing of exceedingly important spacecraft that had to survive during nuclear explosions in space in a strategic environment, and those facilities were made to be exceedingly realistic because it was discovered that unless you were exceedingly realistic, you got results that were off by a country mile; and they were off, and off in an optimistic direction. That is to say, unless you did the job very realistically, you concluded that your spacecraft would survive, but when you are honest about it, you discovered that they would not. Those facilities ceased to be used nearly a decade ago when the U.S. entered the current testing moratorium.
So when you have sufficiently compact systems, yes, you can do very realistic testing. It is necessary to, in some circumstances, people being just human, to confront folks with the prospect of realistic testing in order to elicit candor from them.
We heard at the present time the telephone company says that the telephone infrastructure would survive extremely well. However, when they were asked formally, less than two decades ago, if they could provide service to the Defense Department during a nuclear war situation, they said, not a chance. So the Defense Department went off and spent well over a billion dollars creating a hardened telephone system of an exceedingly extensive geographic nature, but an extremely limited nature as far as service, to connect the national command authority with the strategic war machine here in North America.
That money was spent not because people were so eager to go out and spend money on a hardened telephone system. It was spent because the telephone company said that there is no chance at all that their systems could survive because they were confronted with a prospect of realistic testing.
The same situation pertained to the electric power system. Three decades ago the electric utilities of this country formally assured the government that the power system would ride through a nuclear war; that because there would be so much load lost as cities were vaporized, that there would always be an excess of electric power generating capability relative to what was needed throughout a nuclear war and afterwards.
Then came the 1965 blackout in the Northeast, followed by large-scale blackouts in this country that were attributed to the effects of solar magnetic storms; that is to say, exceedingly weak EMP of the type that God generates when the sun fluctuates in the output of solar wind. The Earth's magnetosphere rattles around as a result. As a result, there are very low-frequency but, over large geographic scales, large-amplitude electric field disturbances around power systems, and the power systems fall apart; not believed to do so, but they have done so, repeatedly. You know, you actually read in the newspapers occasionally that such and such a blackout was attributed to a geomagnetic storm.
Well, after these events, the power—the electric utilities became much more realistic and in the PONAST studies of the 1970s they told the government that they should assume that due to EMP effects, not due to blast and heat or elimination of cities, but due to EMP effects, they should assume the power systems would go down nationwide, and it would be very difficult to reconstitute for the reasons that Dr. Graham said, namely that when a power system goes down, if a piece of it goes down, the rest of the power system can be used to pick it back up and make it operational again. But when the whole system goes down, when a whole interconnection goes down, it is exceedingly difficult to bring it back up. In the case of the northeastern blackout in 1965, in some places it took two or three days to bring it back because people had never brought a power system back before that had gone down over such a wide scale.
LED's are semiconductors. So are transistors, most diodes, solar cells, etc. Therein is the problem.
Those LED's, transistors, etc are formed using semiconductor materials by introducing what is called a doping agent in-between them. The doping agent are impurities that modulate the semiconductors electrical properties and in turn allowing the creation of an electrically tunable end property.
Drilling down into that a little more, that ability to tune the electrical properties is itself a doping process. The overall product such as LED's is created by doping a P&N junction. An P type semiconductor is doped by adding a material that creates 'acceptors' or in other words, a positive charge hole (such as Indium Gallium). An N type semiconductor is doped by adding a material capable of creating donor atoms (such as phosphorus on silicon). Which btw, the standard LED most flashlights are made of are an Indium Gallium on a phosphorus substrate.
The end result is called a P&N junction.
Using an LED as an example, when you turn the flash light on, it sends a specific amount of electricity through the P&N junction.
When it passes through the P&N the energy is forced into a lower energy level. To maintain balance, photons (light) are emitted.
Here is where the rubber meets the road on this. Introduce to much electricity and the PN junction will heat up and burn out.
It doesn't matter if the device in question was on or off. If you want to see this in action, clip a negative and positive lead to a mini-maglight LED and attach them to a 12 volt supply.
Another way to do this is to take a stun gun and zap the same LED laying out on a table. Be sure your wearing gloves and safety glasses if you do either.
It is a false assumption that the device needs to be on or off in terms of the E1 and E2 top down affects from an EMP blast. The heave component of the E3 will also play a role in this. The only real difference between on and off is the off condition affords a touch more resistance as the distance between the initiation points are open circuited rather than closed. If your on the horizon or under a super EMP, the difference won't make a hill of beans.
The 1859 carrington event super solar storm displayed the errors of linear logic when the source of excitation is EMP. The E1 component is in terms of microseconds rise times. The E2 component is in terms up to a second, and the E3 can have rise times from seconds to minutes.
The evidence collected after the K3 soviet test had multiple examples of 'fatigued fuse'. That was the first clue as to why so many homes, businesses, power plants, and generators caught fire. The first hit (E1) weakened the systems with piles of fatigued fuses. fatigued fuse occurs when a fuse is hit with a very high voltage, but in a rise time of only 1-2 microseconds.
The second half of this is as stated in an earlier post. Distance and geographic location. This was displayed in both the carrington solar event, and the K3 Soviet test. Picture what happens if someone backfeeds a generator without killing the main breakers.
In the case of the carrington event, it was 100 percent ground up. The telluric currents supercharged the telegraphic lines and in the process, blowing up the earth batteries used to charge them. Telegraph stations nationwide caught fire.
In the case of the K3, again it was backfeed from the ground up, but it was also hit from the top down. All bets are off as normal precautions to prevent overheated lines go out the window because your ground has become a positive feed. This is true of the lines at the street, and the switch yard at the power plant. Remember that is 'after' the entire system has already been weakened by the E1/2 components.
The geographic element comes from the varying resistance levels within the ground itself. As you know, electricity will follow the path of least resistance up and until it can overcome that resistance.
Most important is the empirical evidence. It has happened already. We can debate the physics of it until the cows come home, but at the end of the day, real world results from the K3 experiment caught multiple locations on fire. The worst part about it was the power plants that caught fire. Not even the Soviets knew/know why that happened for sure, and it was their bomb and experiment.
This is simply from the E3A element of the E3 burst.
http://www.futurescience.com/emp/ferc_Meta-R-321.pdf
Go to page 75 of the PDF.
If you really want to see something interesting, overlay the northeast burst models over each other for all the E3 components.
I believe thats enough. Your solar cells are toast if they are hit by an EMP burst.